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Problem # 18 It is not permissible for them to receive the share of the Imam, Peace be upon him, or the share of the Sadat, nor is it permissible for the Muslims to give anything out of both the shares as long as they remain in the said institutions and do not refrain from it and repent.
Problem # 19 The excuses forwarded by some of those pretending to be scholars and religious leaders for accepting the charge (of such institutions) shall not be accepted from them, even if it is acceptable in the eyes of those ignorant people having superficial religious knowledge.
Problem # 20 Neither morally soundness is a condition for one enjoining or forbidding, nor is it a condition that he must himself act upon what he is enjoining or refraining from what he is forbidding when a person is bound to enjoin (or forbid) in case he fulfils all the requisite conditions, as one who acts on something is bound (to enjoin it) and if he were committing the wrong, he is bound to forbid committing it, in the same way as it is forbidden for him to commit it.
Problem # 21 A minor is not bound to enjoin or forbid (anything), even if he is a discreet adolescent. Nor is it obligatory on a non-Mukallaf like a minor or insane person to enjoin or forbid (another). Of course, if the wrong is such that the person does not agree with its existence at all, a Mukallaf is bound to forbid a non-Mukallaf from its commission.
Problem # 22 If a person committing a forbidden act or omitting an obligatory one is excused by the Islamic canonical law (Shariat) or human reason, it is not obligatory, rather permissible, to forbid him.
Problem # 23 If there is likelihood of a person committing a forbidden act or omitting an obligatory one to be excused, it shall not be obligatory to forbid him, rather it shall be difficult (to decide). If a person breaking fast during the month of Ramadan is likely to be, for example, a traveller, it shall not be obligatory to forbid him, rather it shall be difficult (to decide). Of course, if it is done publicly causing an affront to the Islamic commands, or encouraging people to commit the forbidden acts, it shall be obligatory to forbid him to do it.
Problem # 24 If a person committing a forbidden act or omitting an obligatory one believes it to be permissible, but was mistaken in it, if it were due to the confusion about the subject, as considering fasting to be harmful for him, or the forbidden object being the sole cure for him, it shall neither be obligatory to remove his ignorance nor to forbid him. If it were due to the ignorance about the canonical command, then if he were a Mujtahid or a follower of one who has given a verdict in its favour, then it is not obligatory to remove his ignorance or iterating the canonical command to him. If, however, he was ignorant of a canonical command that he is bound to act upon, then it is obligatory to remove his ignorance and informing him about the actual canonical command and it shall also be obligatory to forbid him.
The act of enjoining the right and forbidding the wrong has grades, and it is not permissible to overstep from one stage to another provided that the purpose is served by the lower stage, rather even if there is its likelihood.
First Stage A person must act himself in a way that it may express his heart-felt abhorrence against the wrong, and his desire thereby for the performance of the right and omission of the wrong. It has also various steps, e.g., winking the eyes, frowning and contracting ones face, or turning one's face or body, deserting a person or abandoning contact with him, or the like.
Problem # 1 It is obligatory to suffice with the above-mentioned step in case of the likelihood of its being effective and eliminating the wrong. Likewise, it is obligatory to content oneself with taking the lowest possible step and adopt the easiest possible course, particularly when the other person feels affronted by such act, and it is not permissible to cross the necessary limit. If there is likelihood of achieving the purpose by winking the eyes conveying what is meant by it, it shall not be permissible to cross over to a higher stage.
Problem # 2 If turning the face or body and desertion, for example, lead to reducing the wrong but not to its eradication, and there is no likelihood of enjoining or forbidding verbally to be effective in its eradication, and it is not possible to forbid without it, it shall be obligatory to do so.
Problem # 3 If there is likelihood of effectiveness in the avoidance of the unjust and tyrant rulers by the scholars of faith and religious leaders, even if in the reduction of the severity of their injustice, they shall be duty-bound to do it. If the contrary like their social contact and communication is supposed to lead to that effect, it shall be indispensable to take into consideration the various aspects and prefer the more important course. In case there is no other obstacle in their way, not even the likelihood of their social contact leading to their glorification, encouragement and emboldening them to disgrace the commands of prohibition or the likelihood of affront to the position of the religious scholars, spiritual leaders and misconception about the scholars of Islam, it shall be obligatory to achieve the said objective.
Problem # 4 If the social communication of the scholars of Islamic faith and religious leaders is devoid of the observation of the necessary preferable consideration, it shall not be permissible for them, particularly when it would lead to their condemnation and attribution of their willingness for the practice of the tyrant.
Problem # 5 If in the rejection of the gifts of the oppressors and tyrant rulers there is likelihood of effectiveness in reduction of their injustice or in their boldness in initiating innovations (in faith), their rejection shall be obligatory, and it shall not be permissible to accept them. If, however, it were otherwise, then it shall be indispensable to take into consideration the various aspects and prefer the more important course, as mentioned before.
Problem # 6 If the acceptance of the oppressors' gifts would consolidate their glory and embolden them in their perpetration of injustice or initiation of innovations (in faith), their acceptance shall be forbidden. In case of its likelihood it shall be more cautious not to accept the gifts. If the case is otherwise, then it shall be obligatory to take into consideration its various aspects and adopt the more important course.
Problem # 7 It is forbidden to acquiesce in the commission of a wrong or omission of a right act. Rather it is not far from abhorring both of them. That is besides enjoining the right and forbidding the wrong.
Problem # 8 Prohibition of acquiescence (in the wrong) and obligation of abhorrence is not conditional as a condition, rather the former is forbidden and the latter is obligatory in all circumstances.
Second Stage Enjoining and forbidding verbally.
Problem # 1 If it is certain that the first stage shall not serve the purpose, it shall be obligatory to shift to the second stage provided that there is likelihood of its effectiveness.
Problem # 2 If there is likelihood of achieving the end by admonition, guidance and soft words, it shall be obligatory to adopt them and not to overstep them.
Problem # 3 If it is certain that the above-mentioned course shall not be effective, he shall have to shift to a sterner stage of enjoining and forbidding, and it shall be obligatory to start with softer words, provided that there is likelihood of their effectiveness, and it is allowed to overstep, particularly if it is a case when the person committing the wrong feels affronted by his words.
Problem # 4 If the elimination of the wrong and maintenance of the right depend on the use of harsher words and adopting a more vigorous course in enjoining, forbidding and warning of opposition, it shall be permissible (to do so) Rather it shall be obligatory (to do so) at the same time refraining from lying.
Problem # 5 It is not permissible to stretch forbidding to what is forbidden and abhorrent like using abusive language, lying or insulting words. Of course, if the wrong is such that is attached a great importance by the Legislator (i.e., Allah, the Exalted) who does not agree with its commission absolutely, like killing a human soul, and commission of heinous crimes and mortal sinful acts, it shall be permissible (to use such language). Rather it shall be obligatory first to forbid, prevent and if necessary to resort to what is mentioned before if it is indispensable for prevention.
Problem # 6 If some of the verbal steps are milder in hurting and insulting than what have been mentioned under the First Stage, it shall be obligatory to confine oneself to them, and let them serve as introduction (to the later steps). If it is supposed that admonition and direction in soft words and cheerful face shall be effective and possibly effective and less hurting than desertion, turning the face or the like, it shall not be permissible to overstep them. There are very different persons among those forbidding others and forbidden by others. For some turning the face or desertion hurts them severely and is a strong affront as compared to the use of words, enjoining or forbidding. So it is indispensable for a person enjoining or forbidding another to take into consideration the difference between the stages and persons, and start with adopting the softest possible course.
Problem # 7 If suppose some of the measures belonging to the first stage are equal to those belonging to the second stage, one is not bound to observe any sequence in them, and he is free to opt whichever he likes.
If, suppose, turning the face is equal to forbidding in hurting the other person, and each of the two is certain or likely to be effective, the person forbidding may opt either, and it is not permissible to shift over to the harsher one.
Problem # 8 If it is likely to be effective and achieve the end by adopting some of the steps of the First Stage together with some other steps of the Second Stage, or by adopting all the measures of the First or Second Stages together or those that can be put together, or putting together both the stages as far as possible, it shall be obligatory to put them together as far as possible.
If it is certain that some of the steps shall be ineffective, while there is likelihood of effectiveness if contracting face, frowning, desertion and verbal forbidding accompanied by harsh words, threatening loud voice and frightening or the like are put together, it shall be obligatory to use them together.
Problem # 9 If the elimination of a wrong or maintenance of a right depends on asking the help of a tyrant for preventing the commission of a sinful act, it shall be permissible (to do so). Rather it shall be obligatory at the same time avoiding any transgression from what is advisable for the performance of the duty, and the tyrant is bound to acquiesce. Rather its elimination is obligatory on the tyrant as on any other, and he shall be-bound to follow what is followed by any other person in forbidding by starting with the softest possible steps.
Problem # 10 If the purpose can be achieved by a lower stage in case of a person and a higher stage in case of another, then apparently it is obligatory to do what is necessary for each individually, and it is not obligatory to entrust to the person who can achieve the purpose by adopting the lower stage.
Problem # 11 If forbidding a person is effective in reducing the wrong, while forbidding another is effective in its elimination, it shall be obligatory to act what is necessary for each of them individually. But if action is taken for what is necessary for one of them thereby eliminating the wrong, the obligation for acting for the other shall drop, contrary to the case when action is taken for the one causing there by reduction of the wrong in which case the duty towards the other shall not drop.
Problem # 12 If it is known briefly that forbidding by either of the two stages is (equally) effective, it shall be obligatory to adopt the lower stage. If the purpose is not achieved thereby, resort shall be made to the higher stage.
Third Stage Forbidding by use of hand
Problem # 1 If one is certain and satisfied that the purpose shall not be achieved by both the stages mentioned before, it shall be obligatory to shift to the Third Stage, and that involves using force by first adopting the softest possible step.
Problem # 2 If it is possible to prevent the person by intervening between him and the wrongful act, he shall be bound to confine himself to that, if it is less troublesome than other measures.
Problem # 3 If the intervention depends on taking hold of the person or the implement of his act, as when it depends on holding his hand, or pushing him aside or occupying his cup in which there is wine, or getting hold of his knife, or the like, it is permissible, rather obligatory (to do so).
Problem # 4 If the elimination of a wrong depends on entering the person's house or his property, and making any change in his property like his carpet or bedding, it shall be permissible (to do so), if the wrong belongs to such important acts that the Lord does not like its violation in whatever way, as killing a human soul, but in other cases, there is difficulty (in its permissibility), it is not far from being permissible to adopt some of the measure in case of preventing some of the wrongful acts.
Problem # 5 If the prevention results in the occurrence of some damage to the person perpetrating the wrongful act, as breakage of his cup (of wine) or his knife, in a way that it was necessary in the act of prevention; then, it is not far from non-entailment of the liability (of the person preventing him). If, however, the damage is caused by the person to the one enjoining or forbidding him, he shall be held liable and considered an offender.
Problem # 6 If a person (enjoining or forbidding another) breaks the bottle containing wine or the box containing the implements of gambling that may not be necessarily required for the prevention of the act, he shall be held liable and considered to have committed a forbidden act.
Problem # 7 If a person transgresses from the necessary limit required in the prevention of the wrong that results in some damage to the person committing the wrong, he shall be held liable, and the transgression shall be considered forbidden.
Problem # 8 If the intervention depends on confining the person in some place or preventing him from leaving his house, it shall be permissible. Rather it shall be obligatory with the observation of the condition of starting with the most lenient and the easiest possible measure. It is not permissible to inflict on him any pain or straitening his livelihood.
Problem # 9 If the purpose is not achieved except by inflicting pain and straitening his livelihood, then apparently it shall be permissible. Rather it shall be obligatory, observing the obligation of starting with the most lenient possible measure.
Problem # 10 If the purpose is not served except by hitting him and inflicting pain on him, then apparently it shall be permissible with the condition of starting with the most lenient and easiest measure. He should also obtain the permission of a jurist possessing all the necessary qualifications. Rather it is necessary in case of imprisoning or inflicting pain, etc.
Problem # 11 If forbidding causes wounding or killing, according to the stronger opinion, it shall not be permissible except by the permission of the Imam, May peace be upon him. At the present time, a jurist possessing the necessary qualifications stands in place of the Imam provided that he fulfills all the conditions.
Problem # 12 If the wrong be such with which the Lord does not agree at all like killing a human soul, it shall be permissible, rather obligatory to prevent it, even if it results in wounding the perpetrator or killing him. So it shall be obligatory to defend the human soul by wounding or even killing the perpetrator, if it is not possible without it, and there shall be no need of obtaining the permission of the Imam, May peace be upon him) or of the jurist fulfilling the necessary conditions. If a person attacks another to kill him, he shall be bound to prevent him, even if by killing him provided that it is safe from evil. In such case, the killer shall have no liability.
Problem # 13 It is not permissible to transgress to killing if there is possibility of preventing it by wounding. In wounding too consideration shall have to be made for starting with possibility the least harmful, so that if a person transgresses, he shall be held liable for it, in the same way as if the perpetrator of the wrong wounds the person forbidding him, he shall be liable for it or if he kills him, he shall be liable for Qisas..
Problem # 14 A person enjoining a right or forbidding a wrong while enjoining or forbidding and in the stages of forbidding must behave like a kind physician treating a patient or like a kind father keeping in consideration interests of the perpetrator of the wrong, and that his act of forbidding the perpetrator must be out of love and kindness, particularly towards him and the community in general. His intention must be to do all that for the sake of Allah, the Exalted and the attainment of His Pleasure, and his act must be free from all the blemishes of his personal desires and manifestation of his own exaltation. He must neither consider himself free from all blemishes, nor higher or more elevated than the perpetrator (of the wrong). Sometimes the perpetrator (of the wrong) or fatal sins possesses some personal qualities enjoying approval of Allah, the Exalted, for which He may love him, though He may be angry with him due to that particular act, while sometimes a person enjoining or forbidding another happens to be otherwise, though this fact may be hidden from himself.
Problem # 15 The most significant, most preferable, the most pleasing quality having the most effective and impressive impact on the people possessed by the individuals enjoining a right or forbidding a wrong, particularly when the person enjoining or forbidding happens to be from among the scholars of faith and religious leaders, May Allah elevate their authority, is that it should be performed by a person wearing the cloak of right, whether obligatory or approved, and abstaining from wrong, rather even anything disapproved, and that he must follow the moral habits of the prophets and the clerics and purifies himself from the habits of the idiots and lovers of the (material) world, so that he may prove to be an enjoining or forbidding person even by his acts, attire and character, and people may be willing to follow him. God Forbid, if he happens to be otherwise, and the people notice that the religious scholar who claims to be a successor of the prophets and a leader of the community does not act upon what he preaches, it shall cause weakness in their faith, and embolden them to commit sinful acts and shall have a wrong opinion about the pious persons of yore. It is, therefore, a duty particularly of the scholars (of faith) and religious leaders to keep away from places of accusation (i.e., places where they may be accused of sinful acts), most significant of them being closeness to tyrant rulers and oppressive chieftains. It is the duty of the Muslim Ummah (Community) that if they find such a religious scholar, they may construe it to be right provided that there is its likelihood; otherwise, they must keep themselves away from him and reject him, he must be a non-ecclesiast, clad in the attire of the ecclesiasts, and a devil wearing the cloak of the scholars, We ask Allah to keep Islam in His Shelter against such person and against his evil.
It has the following Problems.
Problem # 1 No one except the Imam of the Muslims, May peace be upon him, or one designated by him is authorized to have the charge of the political affairs like executing the Hudud, or the judicial or financial matters like collecting the revenues and taxes in accordance with the Shari'ah (or Islamic canonical law).
Problem # 2 In the period of the Occultation of the Waliyyal-Amr and the Monarch of the Epoch, (i.e., Imam Mahdi, the 12th Imam), May Allah hasten his Holy Appearance, stand his general successors in his place for wielding the political authority and all powers held by the Imam, May peace be upon him, except initiating Jihad, and they are the jurists possessing all the qualifications of issuing religious verdicts and judgments.
Problem # 3 It is the collective duty of the general successors (of the Imam) to perform the above-mentioned functions to the extent it is easy and as far as it is possible in case they are free to do so and have no fear of the tyrant rulers.
Problem # 4 It is the collective duty of the people to cooperate with the jurists in the implementation of the policies and other non-litigious matters that are exclusively reserved for them during the Period of Occultation (of the 12th Imam) if possible, and if not, to the extent it is easy and possible.
Problem # 5 It is not permissible to hold the authority entrusted by a tyrant, of executing the Hudud and issuing judgments, etc., not to speak of implementing policies repugnant to Shari’ah.
If a person accepts such authority entrusted by the tyrant in spite of having the power to refuse it, and performs something entailing a liability, he shall be held liable for it, and it shall be a fatal sinful act.
Problem # 6 If a tyrant (ruler) compels him by force to wield authority in any case, it shall be permissible (for him to accept it), except in the case of inflicting death, and the liability shall go to the tyrant. There is hesitation in treating the case of wounding as similar to the case of inflicting death.
Of course, some other important cases are treated at par with the case of inflicting death, which have been mentioned before.
Problem # 7 If a jurist possessing the necessary qualifications accepts the authority for some political or judicial matter or the like entrusted to him by a tyrant ruler, due to some special consideration, it shall be permissible, but he shall be bound to execute the Hudud of Shari’ah and issue judgments according to the criteria of the Shari’ah, and perform the non-litigious matters, but he is not allowed to transgress the limits imposed by Allah, the Exalted.
Problem # 8 If a jurist is of the opinion that acceptance of an authority entrusted by a tyrant ruler shall lead to the enforcement of the Hudud of Shari’ah and the implementation of the divine policies, he shall be bound to accept it, except when its acceptance would lead to tremendous evil.
Problem # 9 A Mutajazzi Mujtahid (A Mujtahid who is allowed to exercise ljtihad in some religious matter, but not in all of them) has no authority in the matters mentioned above. According to the more cautious opinion, his position is similar to that of a common man.
Of course, in the absence of a jurist and a Mutlaq Mujtahid (A Mujtahid who is allowed to exercise ljtihad in all religious matters), it is not far from being permissible for him to accept the authority to issue judgments if he were allowed to exercise Ijtihad in this field.
Similarly, according to the more cautious opinion, he shall be preferable to all other morally sound persons to wield the authority in non-litigious issues.
Problem # 10 It is not permissible to refer the disputes to the tyrant rulers and his judges. Rather the disputants are bound to refer their cases to a jurist possessing the necessary qualifications.
In case it is possible and the person refers the matter to a person other than the jurist, whatever he receives as a result of that judgment shall be forbidden, according to the details in this case.
Problem # 11 If a complainant invites his opponent to refer the case to a jurist, he shall be bound to accept it, in the same way as when the defendant is willing to refer the case to a jurist, the complainant shall not be allowed to refer it to some other person. .
Problem # 12 If a complainant files the case in a Shari’ah court, and the judge summons the defendant, he shall be bound to appear, and his non-appearance shall not be allowed.
Problem # 13 It is the collective duty of the judges of the Shari’ah court to accept the cases referred to them. In case of being the sole judge, it shall be his individual duty (to accept the cases filed in the Shari’ah Court).
There are two Categories of Defense. The First Category concerns the Defense of the Islamic Territory and Its Boundaries, while the Second Category concerns the Defense of oneself, etc.
Problem # 1 If an enemy, who is a danger to the, Islamic Territory and the Muslim society, invades Muslim countries and their frontiers, the Muslims shall be bound to put up defense against him by whatever means possible like aid in the form of money and men.
Problem # 2 Presence or permission of the Imam, May peace be upon him, or that of his general or special representative is not a condition for it. So it is obligatory on every Mukallaf to put up defense by whatever means without any condition or limitation.
Problem # 3 If there is a danger of extensive subjugation of the Muslim countries, their conquest and captivity, defense shall be obligatory by whatever means possible.
Problem # 4 If there is a danger of political and economic subjugation to the Islamic pale leading to their political and economic captivity, enervation of Islam and Muslims and their weakness, it shall be obligatory to put up defense by similar means and measures of negative resistance like boycotting the purchase of the enemy's products and giving their use, and having total suspension of social contact and trade relations with him.
Problem # 5 If there lies in the trade relations (with the enemy) a danger to the pale of Islam and the Muslim countries in the form of foreigners' domination on them politically, etc., leading to their exploitation or the exploitation of their countries, or even morally, it shall be obligatory on the entire Muslim community to refrain from them and prohibit such relations.
Problem # 6 If the political relations between the Islamic states and the foreigners lead to the subjugation of the Muslim countries, people or their property, or their political domination, it shall be forbidden for the heads of the Muslim states to maintain such relations and ties, and all treaties with them shall be declared null and void, and it shall be obligatory on the Muslims to guide their heads of states and force them to renounce them even by means of civil disobedience.
Problem # 7 If there is a danger of foreign aggression on any Islamic state, it shall be obligatory on all the Muslim states to defend her by whatever means possible in the same way as it is obligatory on the Muslims.
Problem # 8 If any of the Muslim states concludes a treaty for relations against the interests of Islam and Muslims, all the Muslim states shall be bound to make efforts for its revocation by political or economic means, such as severing political and trade relations with that state, and it shall be obligatory on all the Muslims to make all possible arrangements for it as by negative resistance (or civil disobedience). Such treaties are forbidden in the Islamic Shari'ah.
Problem # 9 If some of the heads of Islamic states or the members of their parliament are instrumental in bringing about foreign influence, politically or economically, on the Islamic state, in a way that there is danger to the Islamic pale or the independence of the state, even if in future, they shall be deemed traitors and must be deprived of whatever position held by them, even if it is supposed that they had rightfully occupied it, and the Muslim community is bound to punish them even by means of negative resistance, such as their social and commercial boycott and severing relations with them in whatever way possible, and arrange their dismissal from all the political positions and depriving them of the social rights.
Problem # 10 If in the trade relations of some Muslim states or merchants with some foreign states or merchants there lies a danger to the Muslim markets or their vital economic interests, it shall be obligatory to abandon them and declare such trade to be forbidden, and in view of the danger, the religious leaders shall be bound to prohibit their products and trade with them as required by the existing conditions, and the Muslim community shall be bound to follow them, as all its members shall also be bound to endeavor the secession of the said trade relations.
Chapter Two -Second Category
Problem # 1 There is no objection if a person defends himself, his honour or his property as far as possible against enemies, aggressors, thieves and the like.
Problem # 2 If a person is attacked by a thief, etc. in his house, etc. to kill him unjustly (or without any reason), he is bound to defend himself by whatever means possible, even if it results in killing the aggressor, and he is not allowed to surrender and bow before the injustice.
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