Problem # 3 If the exercise of an obligatory act or elimination of a wrong depends on the concerted action in enjoining or forbidding, the duty shall not drop by the action of a few of them, and it shall be obligatory for them to get together for it in sufficient number.

Problem # 4 If some of them, short of the sufficient number, do get together while others fail to do so, and it is not possible for the former to collect others, the obligation shall drop from them, and the sin shall subsist on the recusant ones.

Problem # 5 If one or several individuals do act according to the obligatory duty but of no avail, while it is likely to be effective if joined by one or more persons, it shall be obligatory on the others (to join) provided that they fulfill the required conditions.

Problem # 6 If a person is sure or satisfied about the exercise of the duty by others, he shall not be bound to act. Of course, if it appears to be contrary to his surety, he shall also be bound to act. Similarly, if he is sure or satisfied of the sufficiency of those exercising the duty, he shall not be bound to act. But in case it appears otherwise, he shall also be bound to act.

Problem # 7 Mere likelihood or presumption about the exercise of the duty by another or sufficiency of those exercising the duty shall not be sufficient. Rather it shall be obligatory that both likelihood and presumption must be there. Of course, if testified by two witnesses, it shall be sufficient.

Problem # 8 If the subject of the obligatory duty or wrong disappears, obligation shall also drop, even if it was due to act of the Mukallaf as is the case when a person pours forth water is exclusively to be saved for purification or protection of a human soul.

Problem # 9 If the exercise of the obligatory duty or elimination of a wrong depends on the commission of a prohibited act, then apparently the importance is to be taken into consideration.

Problem # 10 If a person is capable to do either of the acts, namely, enjoining the right or forbidding the wrong, he shall take into consideration the more important of the two. In case they are equal, he shall have the option to choose either of them.

Problem # 11 It is not sufficient at the time of dropping an obligatory act to explain the rule of the Shari'ah or the evils of abandoning the obligatory act and commission of a prohibited act, except that according to the prevalent practice it may be understood, even if by indications, to mean enjoining or forbidding or serving the purpose by both of them. Rather it is sufficient that the other party may take it to mean enjoining or forbidding through some particular indication, even if usually it may not carry that sense.

Problem # 12 Here the act of enjoining or forbidding is an act of a Mowlavi on the part of the person enjoining or forbidding (who should order the exercise of an obligatory act or avoiding a prohibited one) even if of a lower standard. So it is not enough to say. Allah has ordered you to offer prayer or has forbidden you from taking wine, except when it serves the purpose. Rather, it is indispensable to say, for example: Offer prayer, or don’t take wine, or the like, as may mean a command for doing or avoiding something on his part.

Problem # 13 In both the acts, it is not a condition that there must be intention of seeking closeness (to Allah) or sincerity of purpose. Rather they are meant for elimination of corruption and exercise of obligatory duty. Of course, if he has such intention as well, he shall get reward (from Allah) for them.

Problem # 14 There is no difference in the obligation of forbidding whether it is a mortal or venial sin.

Problem # 15 If a person starts the preliminaries of a prohibited act for its commission, then if he knows that it shall lead to a prohibited act, it is obligatory to forbid the commission of the prohibited act. If he knows otherwise, he shall not be bound but to point out the prohibition of the preliminaries or of the intention. If he doubts its leading (to the commission of the prohibited act), then he shall not be bound except in case the said opinion is adopted.

Problem # 16 If a person intends to commit a prohibited act, but doubts whether he is capable to do it, then apparently there is no obligation to forbid him. Of course, if we accept that even the intention of committing a sin is prohibited, then it is obligatory to forbid him from it.

Chapter Two — Conditions for Obligation of the Two (Duties)

There are several conditions for both the duties. (They are as follows)

First Condition. The person enjoining or forbidding must know whether what the Mukallaf is abandoning is right, or what he is perpetrating is wrong. So it is not obligatory on a person who is ignorant of the right and wrong (to exercise the duty). Its knowledge is a condition for the obligation (of the duty), as capability is a condition in the Hajj.

Problem # 1 As regards knowledge, there is no difference between certainty and the recognized methods of Ijtihäd and Taqlid. So if two persons follow a Mujtahid in whose opinion offering Jum’ah prayer itself is obligatory, and so one of them abandons offering it, the other shall be bound to enjoin him to offer it. Similarly, if, in the opinion of their Mujtahid, the juice of the raisins when boiled on the fire is prohibited, and one of them takes it, the other shall be bound to forbid him to do so.

Problem # 2 If the case is different so that the opinion of the person doing or failing to do an act or according to his Taqlid is different from that of the other, and so his action according to himself is lawful, the other shall not be bound (to enjoin or forbid him).

Rather he is not allowed to (enjoin or) forbid the other, not to speak of the case when he has knowledge about it.

Problem # 3 If there is no difference in the case, and there is likelihood of the person committing the wrong to be ignorant of the relevant rule, then apparently it shall be obligatory to enjoin or forbid him, particularly when he is incapable. At first it is more cautious to give him proper guidance of the rule, and then forbid him, in case he persists, particularly when he is a minor.

Problem # 4 If the person acting is ignorant of the matter, it shall not be obligatory to forbid him or removing his ignorance, as is the case when a person abandons prayer ignorantly or forgetfully, or takes an intoxicant out of ignorance of the matter. Of course, if the act is of importance to the other, and he is not willing with its commission or omission in any circumstances, he shall be bound to act by enjoining him or forbidding him, as is the case of killing a human soul.

Problem # 5 If whatever has been abandoned is obligatory in a person's opinion or in the opinion of the one who follows him, or likewise whatever has been done is prohibited, but the opinion of the other person is contrary to his, then apparently he shall not be bound to forbid the other, except when we accept that the very intention of a prohibited act or an act leading to it is prohibited.

Problem # 6 If what is committed is contrary to the necessary caution in the view of both or in the view of the follower of both, then it is more cautious to forbid him. Rather it is not far from being obligatory.

Problem # 7 If a person has a brief knowledge about a prohibited act and he commits both or either of its parts, it shall be obligatory to forbid him in the first case, while it is also not far from being so even in the latter case, except when there is likelihood of the brief knowledge not being consummate to him at all, in which case it shall not be obligatory (to forbid him) at all. Rather it shall not be permissible, or with regards to the definite agreement, it shall not be obligatory. Rather in the latter case, it shall not be permissible.

The same shall be the case in case a person has brief knowledge about the obligation of an act and he abandons all its parts.

Problem # 8 It is obligatory to learn the conditions of enjoining the right and forbidding the wrong, and the cases of its obligation and otherwise as well as its permissibility and otherwise, so that one may not commit a wrong while enjoining or forbidding.

Problem # 9 If a person enjoins the right or forbids the wrong where it is not permissible, it shall be obligatory on the other person to forbid him from doing both.

Problem # 10 If enjoining or forbidding in a case be in relation to some persons may cause disgrace to holy Shari’ah, while it is not so in the eyes of others, it shall not be permissible, particularly when there is mere likelihood of its effectiveness, except when the case happens to be from among the important ones, though cases differ from the point of view of importance.

Second Condition. The enjoining or forbidding be permissible and there is likelihood of its effect. In case one knows or is certain about its being otherwise, it shall not be obligatory.

Problem # 1 The obligation shall not drop by mere presumption about its being ineffective, even if it is strong. However, in case there is considerable likelihood among the wise, it shall be obligatory.

Problem # 2 If two just witnesses testify to its ineffectiveness, even then apparently its obligation shall not drop provided that there is its likelihood.

Problem # 3 If a person knows that forbidding shall not be effective except when accompanied by imploring and exhortation, then it shall be obligatory to do it accordingly. So also if it is known that imploring and exhortation shall alone be effective without enjoining or forbidding, both shall not be far from being obligatory.  

Problem # 4 If a person commits two forbidden acts or omits two obligatory acts, and it is known that enjoining in respect of both shall be effective if done together, while there is likelihood of effect in respect of one of the two itself, it shall be obligatory in respect of that one to the exclusion of the other. If there is likelihood of one of them being effective but not exclusively, it shall be obligatory to take into consideration the more important one. So if a person abandons prayer and fasting, and it is known that enjoining him to pray shall not be effective, while there is likelihood of its being effective in respect of fasting, it shall be obligatory (to enjoin him to pray). If there is likelihood of its effect in respect of one of them, it shall be obligatory to enjoin him to pray. If neither of them is more important, he may opt either. Rather he may enjoin him to do either of the two briefly, provided that there is likelihood of its being effective in respect of that one.

Problem # 5 If it is known or there is likelihood of enjoining or forbidding him being effective if done repeatedly, its repetition shall be obligatory.

Problem # 6 If it is known or there is likelihood of forbidding him in the presence of others being effective and not otherwise, then if the person committing the act commits it in the presence of others, it shall be permissible and obligatory to do so; otherwise its obligation, rather its permissibility, shall be open to question.

Problem # 7 If it is known that enjoining or forbidding a person shall be effective if he is allowed to abandon another obligatory act or commit another forbidden act considering the importance of the case of permission, there shall be no difficulty in its non-permissibility or dropping its obligation. Rather if both are equal in importance, apparently it shall not be permissible, and the obligation shall drop. If the act related to enjoining or forbidding is more important, then the nature of importance is such that the master is not willing to do contrary to it, like killing a respectable soul, permission shall be obligatory; otherwise, there is hesitation, though it is not devoid of significance.

Problem # 8 If it is known that enjoining him is ineffective in a case for the present, but it is known or there is likelihood of the effectiveness of the present enjoining in future, it shall be obligatory to enjoin at present. Likewise, if it is known that forbidding him to drink wine in a definite cup shall not be effective, but it shall be effective in giving it up later absolutely or to some extent, it shall be obligatory.

Problem # 9 If it is known that enjoining or forbidding shall not be effective in respect of the person committing or omitting an act, but it shall be effective in respect of another provided that no attention is paid to him in the address, it shall be obligatory to address the former with the intention of its effect on the other.

Problem # 10 If it is known that if a person enjoins another, it shall not be effective while it shall be effective if enjoined by a particular person, it shall be obligatory to entrust the work of enjoining to that particular person provided that he fulfils its conditions.

Problem # 11 If it is known that such a person is going to commit a prohibited act, and there is likelihood of effectiveness if he is forbidden, it shall be obligatory.

Problem # 12 If the effectiveness of enjoining or forbidding depends on the commission of a forbidden act or omission of an obligatory act, it shall not be permissible, and the obligation shall drop, except when the case has such an important place that the master is not willing if done otherwise in whatever way like killing a respectable soul, while the act on which it depends does not have such importance. So if warding it off depends on entering a usurped house or the like, it shall be obligatory (to do so).

Problem # 13 If the doer of an act is such that if he is forbidden from doing a wrong, he shall insist on doing it, but if he is enjoined, he shall abandon it, then it shall be obligatory to enjoin him, provided that there is no other hindrance. The same rule applies in case of a right.

Problem # 14 If it is known or there is likelihood of effectiveness of forbidding- or enjoining in reducing the severity of a sinful act, but not in its extirpation, it shall be obligatory to forbid the wrong or enjoin the right. Rather it shall not be far from being obligatory if it is effective in changing the more severe sinful act to a less severe act. Rather there is no objection (in its obligation), if the more severe act is such that the master is not willing to do it in any circumstance.

Problem # 15 If there is likelihood that forbidding a person shall be effective in abandoning a definite opposition in respect of the parts of brief knowledge but not in the definite agreement, even then it shall be obligatory (to forbid him).

Problem # 16 If it is known that forbidding a person shall be effective, for example, in abandoning a detailed known forbidden act and commission of some of the parts whose position is known briefly, then apparently it shall be obligatory (to forbid him), except when the one known briefly is of an importance equal to what has been mentioned before to the exclusion of the one known in detail, in which case it shall not be permissible to forbid him. There is difficulty in deciding whether absolute importance necessitates obligation.

Problem # 17 If there is likelihood of effectiveness, and at the same time there is likelihood to the contrary, then apparently there shall be no obligation.

Problem # 18 If the effectiveness (of forbidding) is likely in delay the commission of a wrong or its postponement, then if there is likelihood of his inability to commit it in future, it shall be obligatory (to forbid him). Otherwise, it shall be more cautious (to do so); rather it is not far from being obligatory.

Problem # 19 If two persons know briefly that forbidding by one of them shall be effective but not by the other, forbidding by both of them shall be obligatory. So if one of them forbids and it proves effective, the obligation on the other shall drop; otherwise, it shall subsist.

Problem # 20 If it is known that forbidding by one of the two persons shall be effective (in persuading the person to abandon a forbidden act), while forbidding by the other shall be effective in his persistence in the commission of the sinful act, it shall not be obligatory to forbid him.

Third Condition. The person committing the sinful act must be persistent in its commission. If it is known that he has abandoned it, the obligation shall drop.

Problem # 1 If there appear indications of the person abandoning (the commission of the sinful act) and it is certain that he has abandoned it, then there shall be no difficulty in dropping the obligation. Similar, shall be the rule in case of satisfaction, and if two just witnesses testify to it, when its authority is perceptible or almost perceptible. The same rule shall apply in case of the appearance of penitence and repentance.

Problem # 2 If presumptive signs of his abandonment appear, then whether it shall still be obligatory to enjoin or forbid him, it is not far from not being obligatory. The same rule shall apply if a person doubts about his persistence or abandonment. Of course, if it is known that the person was intending to persist or abandon, and there is doubt about the subsistence of the person's intention, its obligation is likely, though with some hesitation.

Problem # 3 If there are reliable signs of the person's persistence, forbidding him shall be obligatory. If they are unreliable, there shall be hesitation in its obligation. The contrary shall be more in conformity with the traditional authority.

Problem # 4 Persistence here means repetition (of the sinful act) even if once, and not consistency. If a person drinks an intoxicant, and intends to drink it again, forbidding him shall become obligatory.

Problem # 5 Repentance from a sinful act is among obligations. So if a person commits a prohibited act or omits an obligatory one, he is bound to repent instantly In case of its non-appearance, it becomes obligatory to enjoin him. The same rule applies if there is about his penitence. This is something other than enjoining or forbidding in respect of other sinful acts. If a person doubts about the persistence (in committing a sinful act) by another, or knows about his non-persistence, he shall not be bound to forbid him from it, but if he abandons penitence, he shall be bound.

Problem # 6 If it appears from the condition of a person through knowledge, satisfaction or any reliable way that he intends to commit a sinful act that he has not committed before, apparently it shall be obligatory to forbid him.

Problem # 7 The other person's penitence or repentance is not a condition for the obligation of forbidding him. But in case of knowledge or the like about his non-repetition, it is not obligatory (to forbid him), even if his non-repentance on his act is known. It has already been explained that the obligation for enjoining repentance is different from the obligation for forbidding in respect of sinful acts committed.

Problem # 8 If there is knowledge about a person's inability, or it is known through reliable source that he is actually unable to persist (to commit the sinful act), and it is known that he intends to persist due to his ignorance of about his inability, forbidding him shall not be obligatory in respect of an act that is beyond one's capacity, though it is obligatory in respect of abandoning repentance and intending to commit a sinful act, if we accept the opinion declaring it to be forbidden.

Problem # 9 If a person is unable to commit a prohibited act, but was preparing to do it if he becomes able, then if it is known through a reliable source about his (regaining) ability to do it, apparently it shall be obligatory to forbid him; otherwise not, except in case of his intention to do it, provided that we accept it to be forbidden.

Problem # 10 If a person believes he is unable to persist, but, in fact, he happens to be able, then if it is known that he shall commit it if he comes to know of his ability, in such case if the disappearance of his belief is known, apparently forbidding him shall be obligatory in a way that he may not realize his mistake; otherwise not.

Problem # 11 If it is known that one of two or more persons is persistent in the commission of a prohibited act, apparently it shall be obligatory to address in a way that may apply to that person, so that he may say that whosoever drinks wine must give it up, but it is not obligatory to forbid all of them or some particular ones; rather, it is not permissible. If, however, addressing the forbidding in a way that is applicable to the person committing the act shall amount to be an affront to all of them, then apparently it shall not be obligatory, rather not even permissible (to forbid him).

Problem # 12 If it is known that a prohibited act has been performed or an obligatory act has been omitted, but there is no definite knowledge about it, it shall be obligatory in a vague way. If it is known briefly that a person has either omitted an obligatory act or has committed a forbidden one, it shall be obligatory accordingly or in a vague way.

Fourth Condition There should not be in the forbiddance any cause of evil.

Problem # 1 If it is known or is presumed that forbidding a person shall cause a considerable damage to his life, honour or property or any of persons related to him like his close relatives, companions or servants, forbidding him shall not be obligatory and its obligation shall drop. Rather it shall be so even if its considerable likelihood is apprehended by the wise. Apparently other believers are also to be added (to the list of those feared to suffer).

Problem # 2 There is no difference whether the damage or loss relates to the present or future time. If it is apprehended that the damage or loss shall be borne by him or someone else as a consequence, the obligation (of forbidding) shall drop.

Problem # 3 If it is known, presumed or apprehended that there is considerable likelihood that forbidding him shall cause trouble or discomfort to the person or those related to him, it shall not be obligatory. It is not far from being likely to include other believers too (in the list of those feared to suffer).

Problem # 4 If there is fear of damage to one's own life or honour, or the person or honour of believers, forbidding shall be forbidden. Similarly, if there is apprehension of considerable damage to the property of the believers, (the same rule shall apply). If, however, if he fears some damage or loss to his own property, or there is certain knowledge about it, then if it does not mean any trouble or discomfort to him, then apparently the obligation shall not be forbidden. But in case otherwise, it shall not be far from forbidding the obligation.

Problem # 5 If making another to exercise an obligatory act or elimination of a wrong depends on expending a considerable amount of money, it shall not be obligatory to expend it. It is, however, approved to expend it if it does not cause any trouble or discomfort. In case otherwise, it shall not be far from being non-permissible. Of course, if the case is such that the Legislator {i.e. Allah) has attached much importance to it and does not agree with its violation at all, it shall be obligatory (to expend the money).

Problem # 6 If the right or wrong is one that is attached so much importance by the Holy Legislator (i.e., Allah, the Exalted), as the protection of the life or honour of a tribe from among the Muslims, or destruction of Islamic monuments or its records that may cause leading the Muslims astray, or destruction of some of the Islamic places of worship like the Holy House of Allah (i.e., the Holy Ka'bah in Mecca) by extirpating its monuments and situation, and the like, then it is indispensable to keep its importance in view. In such case, the mere damage or loss, whether to one's life or trouble shall not cause the exemption from the duty. If the safeguard of -the Islamic records that may remove the aberration depends on the sacrifice of one or more lives, apparently it shall be obligatory, not to speak of suffering the loss or trouble that is far less (than sacrificing life).

Problem # 7 If some innovation has been made in Islam, and the silence on the part of the scholars of the faith and the religious leaders, May Allah elevates their authority. has led to disgrace Islam and weakening the beliefs of the Muslims, it shall be obligatory to forbid them (from keeping silence) in whatever way it is possible, regardless whether such action is effective in the elimination of the evil or not. The same shall be the case if their silence over failure to forbid the commission of wrongs leads to the same effect. In such case, consideration shall be made for the importance of the issue and not the damage and discomfort involved.

Problem # 8 If, in the silence of the scholars of faith and religious leaders, May Allah elevate their authority, there is apprehension that the wrong may become right, or the right may become wrong, it shall be obligatory (on the people) to express their knowledge (about the apprehension), and it is not permissible to keep silence, even if they know ineffectiveness of their appeal in the abandonment (of the silence). In such case, consideration shall not be made for the damage and discomfort provided the Command is such that the Holy Legislator (i.e., Allah, the Exalted) has attached great importance to it.

Problem # 9 If, in the silence of the scholars of faith and religious leaders, May Allah elevate their authority, lies encouragement and support for the oppressor, God Forbid, silence on their part is forbidden, and they are duty-bound to give vent to their displeasure even if it is not effective in elimination of the injustice.

Problem # 10 If the silence of the scholars of faith and religious leaders, May Allah elevate their authority, is instrumental in emboldening the oppressors on the commission of other prohibited acts and resorting to innovations, keeping silence shall be forbidden on their part, and they shall be duty-bound to forbid (the oppressors), even if it is not effective in the elimination of the prohibited practice being perpetrated (by the oppressors).

Problem # 11 If the silence of the scholars of faith and religious leaders, May Allah elevate their authority, causes misconception about them, their disgrace and their attribution to what is not lawful, while it is not proper to attribute to them, suppose, God Forbid, to be supporters of the oppressors, they shall be duty-bound to forbid them in order to ward off the outrage against their position, even if it is not effective in the eradication of the injustice.

Problem # 12 If the inclusion of some of the religious scholars, for example, in some of the government departments is instrumental in the establishment of one or more obligatory practices, or in extirpation of one or more wrong practices, and there is no more important impediment like dishonouring the position of religious scholarship and religious scholars and weakening the beliefs of the weak believers, it shall be obligatory as a collective duty, except when it is not possible but for some particular individuals from among them due to their special qualifications, then it shall be obligatory on them as an individual duty.

Problem # 13 It is not permissible for the students of religious sciences to join the institutions established by the government as religious institutes as the old schools occupied by the government and being supported bythe Trusts.

Nor is it permissible for them to get their allowance from them, irrespective of its being from the joint fund or the trust of the school itself, etc. due to the cause of tremendous evil apprehended from it against Islam.

Problem # 14 It is not permissible for the religious scholars and the leaders of the religious groups to accept the charge of any of the religious schools offered by the government, regardless whether the money spent on them and the students belongs to the joint fund or the trusts of the schools themselves, etc., due to cause of tremendous evil against the religious and scholarly seminaries in the near future.

Problem # 15 It is not permissible for the religious students to join the religious schools headed by some of the persons dressed in the attire of the religious scholars provided by the tyrant government or by the order of the government, whether their curricula have been designed by the government or the principals, despite their being of religious nature, due to cause of tremendous evil against Islam and the re1igious seminaries in future, May Allah keep them under His Protection.

Problem # 16 If there are indications that a religious institution has been established or its expenditure is met by the tyrant government, even if through various sources, it shall neither be permissible for a religious scholar to accept its charge, nor for the religious students to join it or get their allowance from it.

Rather, if there is a considerable likelihood of it, it is necessary to keep away from it, as a matter that is attached a lot of importance by the canonical law of Islam. So it is obligatory to observe caution in such cases.

Problem # 17 An in charge of such an institution or one joining it is condemned as devoid of moral soundness ('Adalat). It is not permissible for the Muslims to accept them as fulfilling the conditions of moral soundness in matters where moral soundness is a pre-requisite as leading the congregational prayer or testifying as a witness in a divorce, etc.